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A B S T R A C T
Past work has shown systematic differences between Easterners' and Westerners' intuitions about the reference of
proper names. Understanding when these differences emerge in development will help us understand their
origins. In the present study, we investigate the referential intuitions of English- and Chinese-speaking children
and adults in the U.S. and China. Using a truth-value judgment task modeled on Kripke's classic Gödel case, we
find that the cross-cultural differences are already in place at age seven. Thus, these differences cannot be
attributed to later education or enculturation. Instead, they must stem from differences that are present in early
childhood. We consider alternate theories of reference that are compatible with these findings and discuss the
possibility that the cross-cultural differences reflect differences in perspective-taking strategies.
1. Introduction
At birth, we are all given a name, which usually follows us through
life. When people use your name, they typically refer to you. But what is
the mental link that ties a name to a person and allows it to refer?
Two well-known proposals in the philosophical literature seek to
answer this question. The descriptive view, defended by Frege (1892/
1948), Russell (1905) and Searle (1958) among others, holds that a
name gets its referent through definite descriptions. When competent
speakers use a name, they refer to whoever uniquely satisfies the de-
scription associated with that name. For instance, the name “Barack
Obama” refers to Barack Obama because he is the person best fitting the
definite description “the 44th President of the United States”. On this
account, names refer indirectly, mediated by definite descriptions in the
speaker’s mind. The second proposal, Kripke's causal-historical view,
contends that a name refers to a person because it was linked to her in
the initial act of naming and this link is then passed down through a
community of speakers. Kripke argues that proper names are rigid
designators; they continue to refer to the entity initially given the name,
even when that individual turns out to have none of the properties we
associate with that name (Kripke, 1972/1981). On this account, names
refer directly without the mediation of definite descriptions.1
Kripke supported his proposal with a famous thought experiment.
He noted the only thing most people have heard about mathematician
Kurt Gödel is that he was the person who proved the incompleteness of
arithmetic, so this is the only possible definite description that they
could associate with Gödel. Now, imagine that Gödel actually stole the
theorem from someone named Schmidt, who did all the work.
According to descriptivism, when people use the name “Gödel”, they
really refer to Schmidt, who is the unique person satisfying the definite
description they have. Kripke’s intuitions, in contrast, tell him that
speakers use the name “Gödel” to refer to whoever was given that name
initially (Kripke, 1972: 83–4).
Kripke’s intuitions about the Gödel case were widely shared among
philosophers, and thus the descriptive theory lost favor. Machery,
Mallon, Nichols, and Stich (2004), however, questioned the universality
of Kripkean intuitions. They presented stories modeled on the Gödel
case to undergraduates in the U.S. and China and discovered con-
siderable variation in people’s semantic intuitions. While some people
have causal-historical intuitions, others have descriptivist intuitions.
Additionally, these intuitions vary systematically by culture: while
American participants generally endorsed the causal-historical view,
Chinese participants mostly endorsed descriptivism. Subsequent ex-
periments, varying the stimuli and the populations, have replicated this
pattern (e.g., Beebe & Undercoffer, 2015; Beebe & Undercoffer, 2016;
Machery, Sytsma, & Deutsch, 2015; Machery et al., 2010; Sytsma,
Livengood, Sato, & Oguchi, 2015).
To date, however, researchers have not investigated the specific
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causes of the cross-cultural variation. Determining when in develop-
ment these differences appear is a critical first step in doing so, as it will
help us to identify potential causes. For example, differences emerging
in college years would suggest formal education in science or philo-
sophy plays a role. In contrast, if the difference is present by age seven,
it is likely to arise from cross-cultural differences in early social inter-
action and communication. Exploring the developmental trajectory of
the differences could also inform us about the initial basis of reference.
We hypothesize that there are four possible developmental pathways:
I. Initial Descriptivism: Children begin with a descriptivist theory of
reference regardless of culture. English-speaking children move
towards the causal-historical view during development. This sug-
gests that referential links are based primarily on descriptions, and
causal-historical intuitions result from later education and sociali-
zation.
II. Initial Causal-Historical: Children begin with a causal-historical
theory of reference regardless of culture. Chinese-speaking children
shift towards descriptivism as they grow. This pattern suggests that
causal-historical chain serves as the initial basis for reference, with
descriptivist intuitions arising from subsequent socialization and
education.
III. Early Differentiation: Children in both groups possess a culturally
specific theory of reference at a young age, acting like adults from
their culture and exhibiting systematic differences in their refer-
ential intuitions. This indicates that divergence takes place in early
childhood.
IV. Initial Ambivalence: Children in neither culture have developed a
specific strategy for fixing the reference of names, and are equally
likely to rely on descriptive intuitions and causal-historical intui-
tions. This pattern could arise because individual children hold both
theories or because different children utilize different theories.
Testing these hypotheses in young children calls for tools that do not
require counterfactual reasoning or meta-linguistic judgments as the
standard probes do (see Machery et al., 2004: B6-7). The truth-value
judgment task (Crain & McKee, 1985), adopted widely in develop-
mental psychology, can be used with children as young as three.2 If
there are genuine cross-cultural differences in intuitive judgments
about reference, then we should see a similar pattern when asking
questions about truth, since judgments about the truth of a name-con-
taining statement depend on what the referent of the name is (see
Machery, Olivola, & de Blanc, 2009 for related arguments).
2. Experiment
2.1. Participants
Forty English-speaking children in the U.S. (age: 6;6–8;4; mean 7;4;
22 girls) and thirty Mandarin-speaking children in China (age: 6;6–8;3;
mean 7;2; 17 girls) participated. There was no reliable age difference
between these groups (t(68)=−1.15, p= 0.25). Additionally, forty-
seven adult English speakers in the U.S. (mean age=21.4; 32 female)
and forty-seven adult Mandarin speakers in China (mean age= 20.7;
32 female) participated.
2.2. Materials
The stimuli consisted of two critical stories and three familiarization
stories (see Supplementary materials). We constructed stories similar to
the original Gödel case about topics that are more appropriate for
young children. A simplified version of one critical story is given below:
Super Dog Race
Long ago, there was a race called the Super Dog Race. Max, Pickles
and Blaze participated in the race. Max crossed the finish line first,
winning the race, but he got too excited and ran all the way to the
North Pole. Pickles crossed the finish line second. He stopped and
watched Max run away. The race announcer mistakenly thought
that Pickles won the race. He told every newspaper in the world that
Pickles won. He also told them that another dog, Blaze, ran very fast
despite his short legs. Since then, everyone learned that Pickles won
the race. They don’t know anything else about Pickles.
Tom and Emily learned at school that Pickles won the Super Dog
Race. This is the only thing they know about the dog race and
Pickles. They don’t know anything about Max. That night, their dad
asked: Do you know who won the Super Dog Race?
Tom replied: Blaze was the dog that won the Super Dog Race.
Emily said: Pickles was the dog that won the Super Dog Race.
Tom’s clearly false statement is a control. Emily’s statement is the
critical statement that elicits participants’ referential intuitions. It is
true if the name “Pickles” gets its reference from the definite descrip-
tion in her head (“the dog that won the Super Dog Race”). It is false if
reference is based on a causal-historical chain such that “Pickles” ne-
cessarily picks out the original bearer of this name, regardless of any
associated descriptions. Accordingly, a “Yes” answer is considered a
descriptive response, while a “No” answer is considered a causal-his-
torical response.
The familiarization stories are similar, but the reference of the
names in Tom and Emily’s statements is unambiguous. Both statements
are true in one story, both false in another, and one is true and one is
false in the third. Thus, including the two control statements in the
critical stories, there are eight statements with determinate answers,
three that are true and five that are false. We label them as Yes-controls
and No-controls respectively.
The stories are accompanied by clipart pictures to engage partici-
pants. We randomized the order of the familiarization stories and the
critical stories for each adult participant. For child participants, we
created two lists with the stories appearing in different orders. The
order of the two statements in each story was counterbalanced. A native
speaker (J.L.) translated the probes into Chinese for use with Chinese-
speaking participants. All names in the translated probes were typical
Chinese names.
2.3. Procedure
Children sat in front of a screen in the lab and saw the pictures while
an experimenter read the stories aloud from a script and recorded their
verbal responses. Adult participants accessed the study on Qualtrics
through an anonymous survey link. They read each story, with the
pictures interspersed, and answered the relevant questions before pro-
ceeding to the next. After all five stories, they completed a short de-
mographic questionnaire.
2.4. Results and analysis
Table 1 displays the percentage of correct responses to the control
questions. While children in both cultures made more errors than
adults, no group answered less than 80% of the questions accurately,
indicating that the task was manageable even for the children.
To determine whether there were any cultural differences in the
responses to the control statements, a binomial mixed-effects model
was constructed using the R programming language, with culture, age
and their interaction as fixed effects and participant and statement as
random effects.3 We found a main effect of age (z= 6.274, p < 0.001)
but no main effect of culture (z= 0.031, p > 0.1) and no interaction
2 We are aware of the controversy over the appropriate approach to gauge intuitions
about reference in the philosophical and experimental philosophy literature (see Devitt,
2011; Devitt, 2012; Devitt, 2015; Domaneschi, Vignolo, & Di Paola, 2017; Martí, 2009;
Martí, 2012). But due to space limitations, we will not plunge into the debate in this brief
article.
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between age and culture (z= 1.697, p > 0.05). Separate analyses of
the responses to Yes-controls and No-controls also found no reliable
effects or interactions of culture (all p's > 0.1). Thus the two cultural
groups did not differ reliably in their response biases or accuracy.
For the critical statements, “No” responses (coded as 1) were our
dependent variable. As Fig. 1 shows, while children and adults in the
U.S. responded “no” the majority of the time (60% and 65% respec-
tively), children and adults in China did so less often (37% and 48%
respectively). To assess this pattern, a binomial mixed-effects model,
with the same specification as the one above, was created. We found a
main effect of culture (z=−2.841, p < 0.01) but no effect of age
(z= 1.243, p > 0.1) or interaction between culture and age
(z= 0.448, p > 0.1). In short, Americans in both age groups are more
likely to respond to the critical statements in a manner consistent the
causal-historical view of reference than the Chinese are.
3. General discussion
This study produced two clear findings. First, we replicated the
cross-culture difference observed by Machery et al. (2004) using a
truth-value judgment task. Determining the truth of a statement, in this
context, requires participants to determine the referent of the name
occurring in it. If we take the name to refer to the entity who was
originally given the name (consistent with the causal-historical view),
then the statement is false. If we take the name to refer to the person
who actually matches the description in the speaker’s head (consistent
with the descriptive hypothesis), then the statement is true. While our
method differs from Machery and colleagues’, the pattern of findings is
parallel. When fixing the reference of proper names in Gödel-style
probes, American adults are more likely to respond like causal theorists,
whereas Chinese adults give more responses consistent with the de-
scriptive theory.
Second, and most critically, we observed the same pattern in 7-year-
old children. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to
explore the development of cross-cultural variation in referential in-
tuitions. These findings support the early differentiation hypothesis by
demonstrating that children already have culturally specific referential
intuitions by age seven. We found no evidence for either the initial
descriptivism hypothesis (as American children already favored the
causal-historical view) or the initial causal-historical hypothesis (as
Chinese-speaking children already favored the descriptive view). How
early this differentiation emerges is still an open question. It is possible
that one theory is present in all cultures at a younger age, or that
children are ambivalent earlier in development.
These findings raise two questions: what causes the cross-cultural
differences and how does the presence of variation constrain our the-
ories of reference? The distinct cultural patterns at age seven suggest
that formal education in science or philosophy and late socialization
play little role. Instead, the variation must arise from differences in
experience prior to this age, such as early socialization or language
learning. We consider three possibilities below.
One possibility is that our cross-cultural findings result from dif-
ferent interpretations of the specific events chosen for the critical
stories. This is because actions like winning a race or discovering an ar-
tifact could be socially or externally defined, making them somewhat
ambiguous. For instance, maybe for the Chinese, who belong to a more
collectivist culture, the “winner of the race” is the person declared the
winner by the judge rather than the person who crossed the finish line
first. Likewise, they may consider the “discoverer of Claymen” to be the
person who first shared that knowledge with others rather than the
person who initially uncovered the clay figures. If this is the case, it
could be that what differs across cultures is the construal of the pre-
dicates, rather than the reference of the names themselves. However, in
a follow-up study using four new stories that do not involve actions that
can be socially defined (e.g., building a hospital, writing a book, baking
a cake, and drawing pictures), we replicated the cultural effect robustly.
Adult participants from China provided causal-historical responses 34%
of the time, while American participants responded causally 90% of the
time. We therefore believe it is unlikely the cross-cultural patterns stem
from divergent understanding of the actions involved in the vignettes.
Another possibility is that these findings could reflect differences in
norms of politeness in Chinese and American culture. Since the Chinese
are generally harmony-oriented and tend to avoid contradicting others
(Intachakra, 2012; Nisbett, 2003:45; 173–190), they might be less
likely than Americans to reject another’s statements in our truth-value
judgment task. Our analysis of responses to control statements rules out
a strong version of this hypothesis: there were no differences between
the two cultural groups in their accuracy for either the Yes- or No-
controls. Thus the Chinese subjects readily contradicted an imaginary
speaker when she was unambiguously wrong. This leaves open the
possibility that politeness norms play a subtler role. For example, if
participants have access to both interpretations of the ambiguous
names, politeness considerations might affect which of the two they
favor.
The third hypothesis is that different perspective-taking strategies
induce cross-cultural variations in people’s referential intuitions.
Research in cultural psychology has found that Chinese adults and
children are better perspective takers than their American counterparts
(Luk, Xiao, & Cheung, 2012; Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006;
Wu, Barr, Gann, & Keysar, 2013; Wu & Keysar, 2007). Our critical
stories, and Gödel-style probes more generally, depend on an asym-
metry in the knowledge state of the embedded speaker (e.g., Emily) and
the participant (Sytsma & Livengood, 2011). Emily believes that Pickles
is the winner of the race but knows nothing else. The participant knows
that Emily believes this, knows that it is incorrect, and, by necessity,
knows a bit more about Pickles (e.g., that there was a dog dubbed
Pickles who did not win the race). Consequently, how we fix the re-
ference of the name “Pickles” may depend on whose perspective we
access most readily. If Emily's perspective is immediately available to
us, we might gravitate toward the descriptivist intuition and judge the
statement true. In contrast, if our own perspective is more salient, we
might privilege causal-historical information and reject the statement.
Table 1
Percentage of correct responses to all control statements.
Children Adults
American Chinese American Chinese
Yes-Controls 86% 80% 93% 91%

































Fig. 1. Proportion of causal-historical response to critical statements.
3 Correct responses were coded as 1. The model specification was:
Controls.lmer= glmer (Correctness∼ Culture * Age+ (1|Participant)+ (1|Statement),
data=Controls, family= binomial).
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On this proposal, Chinese speakers have descriptivist intuitions more
often because they are more likely to take the embedded speaker's
perspective.
It is critical to note that we found considerable variation within each
of the groups we studied: some Chinese speakers provided only causal-
historical responses, some English speakers provided only descriptivist
responses, and many participants gave responses of both kinds. Thus it
would be unwise to characterize any particular cultural group as being
“pure descriptivists” or “pure causal theorists” (see Genone &
Lombrozo, 2012; Nichols, Pinillos, & Mallon, 2016). Instead, it seems
that people in both groups have access to multiple strategies for fixing
reference and shift between them, perhaps based on factors like po-
liteness or perspective taking.
What are those strategies for reference-fixing? At the beginning of
the paper, we introduced the two possibilities that motivated the Gödel
story and the subsequent research in experimental philosophy: (1) re-
ference is fixed by a description, that is either in the head of the speaker
or shared by the linguistic community (resulting in acceptance of the
critical statement) or (2) reference is fixed by a causal-historical link
that is established at birth and cannot be broken (resulting in rejection).
There are, however, alternate forms of descriptivism and the causal-
historical theory which complicate the interpretation of our findings,
and all the previous studies relying on Gödel-style probes. For example,
it is possible that people always fix reference on the basis of a definite
description but that the locus and content of that description varies.
Some people may rely on the descriptions available to the speaker and
her linguistic community (speaker-relative descriptivism) while others
rely on the description that would be available to an omniscient, out-
side observer, such as the narrator or the participant in these studies
(assessor-relative descriptivism).4 On this account, our data is evidence
for a cross-cultural difference in the rate of speaker-relative and as-
sessor-relative descriptivism that emerges by seven. There are also al-
ternative versions of the causal theory that can accommodate the ob-
served variability. For example, perhaps many Americans (and a few
Chinese) prefer to fix reference based on a causal-historical chain
stretching between an initial naming event and contemporary use of
this name (as Kripke proposes). But perhaps for most Chinese (plus a
few Americans), the key to reference fixing is what Evans’ (1973) called
the “dominant source of the causal origin” of the information associated
with a name, which in our probes is the false history that had been
passed down over generations in Emily’s linguistic community. Ac-
cording to this theory, the cross-cultural differences is about which
causal links are deemed most relevant.
In sum, previously observed cross-cultural patterns in referential
intuitions hold up in a different and arguably more naturalistic truth-
value judgment task. These cross-cultural differences are fully in place
by seven years of age. Thus, whatever triggered them must be present in
early childhood. The non-categorical response patterns in both cultural
groups suggest that the referential mechanism of proper names might
be fluid in the sense that it varies across individuals within a culture
and perhaps within an individual over time. By exploring this fluidity,
we may better understand the cognitive mechanisms underlying refer-
ential intuitions.
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